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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee Trustco, Inc. 
adopts the following designations for the parties: 
Appellant Asael Farr & Sons "Farr" 
Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange "TIE" or "Farmers" 
Appellee Andrew L. Reed "Reed" 
Appellee Trustco, Inc "Trustco" 
Appellee Safeco Insurance Company "Safeco" 
Appellee American States Insurance Company "American States" 
Appellee Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company . . "Hartford" 
Appellee Stephen D. Kirchen "Kirchen" 
Appellees Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. and Central Bonds 
and Insurance Company "Central Bonds" 
Appellees Blackburn Jones and Company and E. Kent Jones . . "Blackburn Jones" 
Appellees Trinity Universal Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc. and 
Trinity Unitrin Property & Casualty Insurance Group "Trinity" 
Appellee Auto Owners Insurance Company "Auto Owners" or "Owners" 
VI 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
1 in. i i.iii I ouri ol" Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated .i M M 
STATEM E NT O F ISSJ JES 
1. Did. the trial coi irt properly grant Trustee)'s motion 'for summary 
judgmei it, wl ler € I i i istco succe.vsiLiv . .-u/.vi * AW . J .* > i-.ui.s= > quoicd saiixw n^urance 
CON C r . i P C ? 
2. Did the trial court properly deny Farr's motion for partial summary 
judgment against Trustco, where Fair received the insurance coverage Reed requested on 
Fan "'s bel lalf? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court will review ' * l ' • 
decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, affording the trial court no deference. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
tl: le i ! it. :) v a t ig pai 1 y is ei ititled t : ji idgii ic i it as a i i: latter of la \ v C "- est woot i Co i }e Apt u in iei its 
Business Trust v. Turner, 2007 U I 48, 164 P.3d 1247. 
Farr preserved these issues on appeal. (R , 3 4 9 7 - o 15) 
CONS I II I IK >i\AL lf K* :*) NS, ST A H .LJ^SJETC. 
'I 'here are i IOCOI istiti ltioi ialpro\ isioi is,stati ites,ordii lai ices,i i llesoi regi llations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit arises from a May 29,2003 incident at an ice cream "cold storage 
warehouse" located in Salt Lake City, Utah owned by plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company 
("Farr"). Farr alleges an electric condenser fan motor accidentally sheared off its mount and 
severed an ammonia line, releasing ammonia which contaminated Farr's ice cream product 
and rendering the product unmarketable. At the time of the loss, Farr was insured with 
Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco") and Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance 
Company ("Hartford"). Because the insurance coverage with Safeco and Hartford was 
insufficient to cover the damages allegedly sustained in the loss, Farr seeks additional 
damages from a broad array of insurers, agents and brokers. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
After extensive discovery, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment 
and Farr filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted all 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Farr's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts1 
1. Duane Farr, as Farr's general manager, had the most involvement with 
1The following facts are pertinent to that portion of the trial court's June 15, 2007 Order 
granting Trustco's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying Farr's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Trustco. 
2 
procur ing the insurance at issue in this case. (R 2522) 
2. D u a n e Farr w a s invoKcu »\iii. pt\ . u n n g i a r r ' s insurance U). . A C . -
fi/v < :1 .< )1 1: ;ii: 1 ;; > ;; /( ; ir j: )t i, y I 1 1 i I\ 1; i;; < 29. 2003 ; u xi< h ;i it (R 2S?"^?T> 
3. D u r in g that t ime, D u a n e Farr util ized " m a n ) brokers . ' < \< '.! : ^ 
4 . For the pol icy year p reced ing the loss (i.e.. M a y 14. 200? to -hi; 1, 
\ IM,' * t. j nrr w a s insured by Defei idai it I i ii lit} ' ! Jni v ei sal Ii isi irai ice Coi i ipai v > • : Il: Kai isas 
\ '- •-'•• f :nr , iM'i i r "h H!;vi.b- snJonesComnam {"BlackburnJones"). 
(R. 1425; 1445-51) 
5. The equipment breakdown coverage in 11 inii\ * pwiiL\ po - u\ ; a unit 
oi \::N •• • cuiLic \ ss of pei isi lablegood- . , . . . ; , . , \ 
: "> x^ ] i u- '^ 
6. In March 2003, Trinity notified Farr that the Trinity policy would not 
be renewed and Farr's coverage woi ild cease on May 14, ..!()()'» I K 1 I ! N, I IJ'Mli) 
7 . • • • • > , . , t , . h . .
 l g 
replacement insurance covenme for the expinim ! naity policy (R. 1431) 
8. D u a n e Farr coniacted or was contacted by several insurance agents to 
pro \ uk i-ki> on i an . insurance . * ) 
9 . I ) * -1 " ' I O ' - O :IV»(M " . . r '• . i b i - r ' * J ic c»u e ' ' a i ? e 
and limits of the expiring' 1 rinity policy, as Mr. Farr wanted to compare "apples to apples." 
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This information included the $25,000 limit for the loss of Farr's perishable goods resulting 
from a release of ammonia. (R. 1440-41) 
10. Farr subsequently received several bids for insurance coverage from 
various agents, including a proposal from Defendant Andrew Reed ("FLeed") on behalf of 
Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE")- (R- 1431-32) 
11. Also among those proposals was one from Blackburn Jones on behalf 
of Safeco.2 That bid, however, was rejected by Farr because it was received after the 
deadline imposed by Dexter Farr. (R. 1435-37) 
12. During Farr's efforts to replace its insurance coverage, Reed, a TIE 
captive agent, met in person with Duane Farr. (R. 750-53) 
13. TIE provided workers compensation coverage for Farr, and Reed 
wanted to obtain all of Farr's insurance business. Id. 
14. Reed suggested an increase in Farr's spoilage coverage limit, but Duane 
Farr rejected any increase above the coverage limit that had been in place during the previous 
year. (R. 1726-27) 
15. Reed subsequently discovered that TIE would not write the coverage 
for Farr that Reed requested. (R. 779) 
defendants Safeco Insurance Company and American States Insurance Company are 
referred to interchangeably in the insurance industry as "Safeco." (R. 2532) The two companies 
will be referred to collectively as "Safeco." 
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16. Reed, as a captive agent for Farmers, was required to attempt placement 
of Farr's coverage with TIE. Once TIE declined Farr's coverage, Reed became free to shop 
around with other insurers in an attempt to place Farr's business. (R. 768) 
17. Reed attempted unsuccessfully to place Farr's property coverage with 
Auto-Owners Insurance, using agent Steve Kirchen. When Auto Owners declined coverage, 
Kirchen contacted Trustco principal Troy Granger on Reed's behalf. (R. 1841-2; 1855-57) 
18. Kirchen knew that Trustco was an agent of Safeco, and that Safeco had 
prepared a previous coverage quote for Farr in conjunction with Blackburn Jones. (R. 1855-
57) 
19. On May 23,2003, Reed informed Duane Farr that Farr had no property, 
liability or equipment breakdown insurance in place. (R. 2527) 
20. Duane Farr first became aware of Trustco on May 23, 2003, six days 
prior to the accident at issue in this case. When asked at his deposition who Trustco was, 
Duane Farr stated: "I'm assuming it's just an agent here in Salt Lake. I don't know. Haven't 
been involved with them." (R. 2524) 
21. Duane Farr further testified about his understanding of Trustco's 
involvement: 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Reed what insurer would be 
involved now that Trustco was entering the 
picture? 
A. I thought it was Trustco. I didn't know who it 
was. 
5 
Q. Did you assume that Trustco was an insurance 
company? 
A. I didn't know who Trustco was. 
Q. So is it fair to say you didn't have any idea of 
what their role was in this whole thing? 
A. Not really. 
Q. And you just assume [sic] that Mr. Reed knew 
what he was talking about. 
A. I did. 
Q. And you relied on his directions to you about 
signing that letter. 
A. I did. Yeah. 
Q. You never had any direction communications 
with Trustco or anyone at Trustco. 
A. I don't recall having any. 
Q. To this day? 
A. To this day. 
(R. 2525-26) 
22. Trustco first became aware of Farr's insurance needs on May 23,2003, 
the day Duane Farr signed a "broker of record" letter. The broker of record letter stated: 
Please acknowledge Trustco, Inc. as our exclusive Broker of 
Record to handle all the affairs associated in the writing of our 
policy. We would like to have coverage bound effective today 
May 23, 2003. Therefore we would ask that you release all 
information and quotes to Trustco, Inc. as soon as possible. 
6 
We ask that you waive the ten (10) day waiting period as no 
rescinding letter will be submitted. 
(R. 1667,2538) 
23. Trustco principal Troy Granger kept the following notes about what 
occurred on May 23, 2003: 
Got phone call from Steve Kirchen. "How would you like to 
have a $50,000 acct. dropped in your lap?" "It has to be done 
today." I stayed in town and got it done. We did [a broker of 
record] letter and I talked to [Safeco employee] Chatrice, she 
confirmed she got it. I asked her about coverage being bound 
and she said it was. I told her to go with all coverages except 
auto as they had gone to Farmers with auto. 
(R. 2538) 
24. At this time, Granger understood that "the whole [Farr] account had 
been quoted by Safeco through another [Blackburn Jones] agent." For that reason, Granger 
believed that Trustco's only task was to obtain the broker of record letter and bind the 
previously-quoted Safeco coverage. (R. 2531-32) 
25. At all times pre-loss, Reed understood Granger and Trustco were relying 
on him to convey to Trustco what Farr wanted in terms of insurance coverage. (R. 2541) 
26. Granger had the same understanding: 
Q. So you didn't feel that there was any need to 
review coverages with the Farrs directly because 
of what you've testified to here. Right? 
A. It was made clear that was not to be my role. That 
was to be Andrew [Reed's] role, and I relied on 
7 
Andrew to get that information to me. That's 
correct. 
Q. You never met with the Farrs? 
A. Never met with the Farrs. 
(R. 2535-36) 
27. Without explaining Trustco's role in obtaining insurance coverage, Reed 
instructed Duane Farr to sign the letter appointing Trustco as Farr's broker of record. The 
letter stated that Farr "would like to have coverage bound effective today May 23, 2003...." 
(R. 1667,2528) 
28. Trustco bound the previously-quoted Safeco coverage for Farr on March 
23,2003. (R. 1908,2538) 
29. As with the prior year Trinity policy, Safeco's policy provided 
equipment breakdown coverage for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from 
the release of ammonia with a limitation of $25,000. (R. 1463-1468) 
30. Safeco has paid Farr the $25,000 policy limit for ammonia 
contamination of Farr's product. (R. 1470-72) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Farr's Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") asserts negligence, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel claims against Trustco, based on 
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Trustco's alleged failure to ensure that Farr had adequate insurance coverage.3 Trustco was 
not asked to review Farr's coverage, and had no independent duty to do so. Trustco did what 
it was asked to do: bind the previously-quoted Safeco coverage on May 23,2003. Due to the 
limited scope of Trustco's involvement, Farr's direct claims against Trustco fail as a matter 
of law. Farr also seeks to impute liability to Trustco for Reed's alleged acts or omissions, 
claiming that Reed was Trustco's subagent. That claim fails as well, because the undisputed 
facts show Reed was not authorized to act on Trustco's behalf, and was not subject to control 
by Trustco. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRUSTCO IS NOT LIABLE TO FARR, BECAUSE TRUSTCO 
PERFORMED AS REQUESTED 
Farr alleges Trustco failed to obtain certain insurance coverage for Farr, and 
should therefore be held liable for Farr's alleged damages. The trial court correctly 
dismissed Farr's claims against Trustco with prejudice, because Trustco's pre-loss 
involvement was limited to obtaining previously-quoted coverage for Farr. Trustco did not 
undertake an independent investigation of Farr's insurance needs, and had no duty to do so. 
A. Farr's Negligence Claim Fails Because Trustco Had No Duty to Obtain 
Additional Coverage for Farr 
Courts require special circumstances before an insurance agent will owe an 
3The TAC also includes causes of action entitled "'Bad Faith" (Count III), and 
"Declaratory Relief (Count V). These claims are either redundant or derivative of Farr's other 
claims, and are not addressed separately herein. 
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insured a duty to obtain adequate coverage. Trustco had no direct dealings with Farr prior 
to the May 29, 2003 accident. Trustco worked solely through Reed in binding the 
previously-quoted Safeco coverage. Reed never requested that Trustco review Farr's 
coverage. Accordingly, Trustco owed no duty to obtain additional coverage for Farr's 
potential losses due to ammonia leaks. 
Although Utah courts have not specifically analyzed an insurance agent's duty 
to procure adequate coverage, Utah courts have analyzed an agent's duty to procure 
insurance. In Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2004), a client brought negligence 
claims against an insurance agent for the agent's alleged failure to procure insurance before 
a fire destroyed the client's business. The Utah Supreme Court held that an insurance agent 
does not have a duty to procure insurance unless: (1) an agent accepts an application; (2) 
makes a bare acknowledgment of a contract covering a specific kind of casualty; (3) lulls the 
other party into believing a contract has been effected through promises; and (4) has taken 
care of the insured's needs without consultation in the past. Id. at 735. 
Analogizing to Harris, Trustco took no action which created a duty to procure 
adequate coverage for Farr. Trustco did not "lull [Farr] into believing" it had adequate 
coverage. In fact, Trustco and Farr engaged in no communication whatsoever. Furthermore, 
there was no prior course of dealing between Farr and Trustco showing Trustco had "taken 
care of [Farr's] needs without consultation in the past." If Farr was concerned about its level 
of coverage, Farr or Reed was responsible for conveying that concern to Trustco. As it was, 
10 
Trustco first learned of Farr's insurance needs on May 23,2003. Reed informed Trustco that 
Farr needed coverage that day. Due to the time constraints imposed by Farr and Reed, 
Trustco had no opportunity to assess Farr's insurance needs (even assuming Trustco had been 
asked to do so). Accordingly, Trustco had no duty to obtain adequate coverage for Farr. 
Other jurisdictions have commented more directly on an insurance agent's duty 
to obtain adequate coverage. Generally, "although an insurance agent has an obligation to 
follow a customer's instructions and procure adequate coverage on the best terms available, 
an agent who fulfills this obligation does not have a duty to advise the insured regarding the 
adequacy of the coverage, absent a specific agreement to do so or a special relationship with 
the customer...." 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises, Inc., 22 
P.3d 481, 486 (Alaska 2001). 
A special relationship may arise in the context of a long-standing relationship 
between agent and insured, and where the insured seeks advice or questions the adequacy 
of coverage. Trupiano v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 654 N.E. 2d 886, 889 (Ind. App. 1995). 
However, "even where an agent has some knowledge that an insured may require additional 
insurance, a duty does not arise if the agent and customer had no prior dealings in which the 
agent has customarily taken care of the client's needs without consulting him or her." 43 
Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Pickens v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Companies, 836 S.W. 2d 
803, 805 (Tex. App. 1992); see also Martinonis v. Utica Nat. Ins. Group, 840 N.E. 2d 994, 
996 (Mass. 2006) (holding that "there is no general duty of an insurance agent to ensure that 
11 
the insurance policies procured by him provide coverage that is adequate for the needs of the 
insured.") 
In Murphy v. Kuhn, 682 N.E. 2d 972, 976 (N.Y. 1997) The New York Court 
of Appeals summarized some of the policy reasons underlying the rule that insurance agents 
ordinarily have no duty to advise customers to obtain additional coverage: 
Insurance agents or brokers are not personal financial counselors 
and risk managers, approaching guarantor status. . . . Insureds 
are in a better position to know their personal assets and abilities 
to protect themselves more so than general insurance agents or 
brokers, unless the latter are informed and asked to advise and 
act.. . . Furthermore, permitting insureds to add such parties to 
the liability chain might well open flood gates to even more 
complicated and undesirable litigation. 
Another reason insurance agents have no general duty to advise customers to 
obtain additional coverage is that imposing such a duty "could afford insureds the 
opportunity to insure after the loss by merely asserting they would have bought the additional 
coverage had it been offered." Neilson v. Davidson, 456 N.W. 2.d 343, 347 (Wise. 1990). 
Finally, the Alaska court in Peter v. Schumacher Enterprises, Inc. observed: 
An undesirable consequence of imposing such a duty [to advise] 
would be that agents would defensively tend to advise their 
customers to buy the highest, most comprehensive and 
expensive coverages rather than more modest packages that 
most people of similar means would find suitable. This could 
result in a mis-allocation of personal resources of individual 
insureds. 
Peter at 486. 
There were no prior dealings between Farr and Trustco or Reed and Trustco. 
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Duane Farr never communicated with Trustco before the May 29, 2006 ammonia spill. 
Neither Farr nor Reed sought advice from Trustco before Farr's May 29,2003 loss, regarding 
the adequacy of Farr's coverage. All communications regarding Farr's insurance coverage 
went through Reed. Based on these facts, no special relationship existed between Farr and 
Trustco, and Trustco had no duty to advise Farr about the adequacy of its coverage. Farr's 
negligence claim against Trustco fails as a matter of law. 
B. Farr's Breach of Contract Claim Fails Because Trustco Did What 
it Agreed to Do 
In Harris v. Albrecht, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the elements giving rise 
to a contract to procure insurance: "a contract to procure insurance may arise when the agent 
has definite directions from the insured to consummate a final contract, when the scope, 
subject matter, duration, and other elements can be found by implication, and when the 
insured gives the agent authority to ascertain some of the essential facts." 86 P.3d at 731 
(citations omitted). The court also stated that "previous dealings between the parties are the 
strongest and, in most instances, the most definite basis for implying terms of a contract." 
Id. at 732. 
In the present action, Trustco fulfilled all of the terms of its agreement with 
Farr. Farr, through Reed, requested that Trustco (1) serve as its broker of record, and (2) 
bind coverage effective May 23, 2003. Trustco accomplished both tasks. Trustco received 
no "definite directions" to evaluate Farr's coverage, nor did Farr give Trustco the 
opportunity to ascertain any of the "essential facts" surrounding its coverage. Accordingly, 
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Trustco did not breach any contract with Farr. 
Farr contends that Granger's May 23, 2003 personal notes are somehow 
representative of Farr's level of insurance coverage. However, Farr's argument relies on a 
strained interpretation. Granger's notes state: 
Got phone call from Steve Kirchen. "How would you like to 
have a $50,000 acct. dropped in your lap?" "It has to be done 
today." I stayed in town and got it done. We did [a broker of 
record] letter and I talked to [Safeco employee] Chatrice, she 
confirmed she got it. I asked her about coverage being bound 
and she said it was. I told her to go with all coverages except 
auto as they had gone to Farmers with auto. 
(R. 2538) 
Based on Granger's notes, Farr argues Trustco's request that "all coverages" 
be bound on May 23, 2003 means "Farr was entitled to 'all coverages' which are reasonable 
to fully insure Farr for the loss it incurred." (Farr brief p. 17). This ignores the fact that the 
Farr account had been previously quoted by Safeco through Blackburn Jones, and Trustco 
was only requested to bind all coverages which had been previously quoled by Safeco. Farr's 
breach of contract cause of action fails because Trustco did everything it was asked to do for 
Farr. 
When Granger wrote the phrase "all coverages" in his notes, he wasn't binding 
blanket coverage for any conceivable loss. Rather, Granger was binding all coverages that 
w ere previously quoted to Safeco through Blackburn Jones. There is no evidence otherwise.4 
4There is also no evidence Reed or Farr ever saw Granger's May 23, 2003 personal notes 
prior to this litigation Hence, they could not have relied on Granger's "all coverages" notation. 
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C, Trustco Breached No Fiduciary Duties Owed to Farr 
Farr alleges Trustco acted jointly with and as agent for Safeco. (Farr brief, p. 
24). It is generally accepted that "an agent of the insurer, who acts within the scope of his 
or her authority, for a disclosed company, is not liable to the insured, either in contract or in 
tort, unless the agent is deemed the agent for the applicant or insured, such as where the 
agent undertakes to procure a policy, but fails to do so. Thus, where the agent's acts are 
those of the insurance company, the action must be brought against the company...." 43 Am. 
Jur. 2d Insurance § 161. Throughout the course of this litigation. Farr has alleged that 
Trustco acted as Safeco's agent. As Safeco's agent, Trustco owed no fiduciary duties to Farr. 
Even if Trustco acted as Farr's agent, as opposed to Safeco's, Trustco violated 
no fiduciary duties it allegedly owed to Farr. Farr never had any communications with 
Trustco, nor did Farr give Trustco any directions regarding its coverage needs. The only 
direction Trustco received was to bind the previously-quoted Safeco coverage on May 23, 
2003, as instructed by Reed. 
As discussed above, an insurance agent's duty to advise a client regarding the 
adequacy of coverage generally does not arise until the customer seeks advice or questions 
the adequacy of coverage. 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 162; Trupiano v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
654 N.E. 2d 886 (Ind. App. 1995). In responding to this argument in the trial court, Farr 
conceded that Trustco was not asked to evaluate the adequacy of Farr's coverage: 
While Reed may have questioned the adequacy of Farr's 
coverage under the expiring Unitrin/Trinity policy, Farr "knew 
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I had plenty of insurance covering products..." and, on May 23, 
2003, Farr was not seeking advice. Farr knew it was "very 
critical" to get coverage: "I had to have coverage, yes." 
(R. 3212, emphasis added.) It is undisputed that May 23, 2003 was the first day Trustco had 
any involvement in obtaining insurance coverage for Farr. Farr concedes that on May 23, 
2003, "Farr was not seeking advice." Rather, Farr was taking whatever steps necessary in 
order to obtain coverage: 
Farr signed a request for insurance coverage drafted by Trustco 
which very clearly defined Trustco's duty/undertaking: 1) 
requesting Safeco to "acknowledge Trustco as our exclusive 
Broker of Record to handle all the affairs associated in the 
writing of our policy" and 2) telling Safeco "we would like to 
have coverage bound effective May 23, 2003." 
(R. 3213) 
In successfully binding the previously-quoted Safeco coverage, Trustco timely 
accomplished everything it was asked to do for Farr. For that reason alone, Trustco could 
not have breached any fiduciary duty it may have owed to Farr. 
D. Farr's Equitable Estoppel Claim Based Entirely on Reed's 
Commitment Fails as to Trustco 
Farr's equitable estoppel claim is based on Reed's alleged "commitment" to 
Farr: 
50. The affirmative representations that were made and given 
by Reed, acting for and on behalf of the Primary Defendants, 
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that are referred to in paragraph 21 above [Reed's Commitment] 
were reasonably relied upon by plaintiff. [TAC at ^ 50] 
To prevail on its equitable estoppel claim, Farr must prove: "1) an admission, statement, or 
act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 2) action by the other party on the faith 
of such admission, statement, or act, and 3) injury to such party resulting from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." Celebrity Club, Inc. 
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'«., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). Farr cannot meet these 
elements with respect to Trustco. Trustco did not make any statement to Farr. Reed's 
statements are insufficient because, as discussed below, Reed did not have authority and was 
not acting as an agent of Trustco when the alleged statements were made. Thus, the first 
element for an estoppel claim cannot be satisfied. 
Additionally, the reliance element cannot be satisfied as to Trustco, given that 
Duane Farr had no understanding of Trustco's role. Mr. Farr claims he relied solely on Reed, 
and simply did what Reed told him to do. Meanwhile Trustco obtained what it was asked 
to obtain: the previously-quoted Safeco coverage. Thus, Farr cannot establish it relied on any 
representation by Trustco regarding the scope and amount of coverage of the previously-
quoted Safeco policy. 
II. REED WAS NOT TRUSTCO'S SUBAGENT 
In an attempt to impute Reed's actions to Trustco, Farr argues, without 
analysis, that "Reed was authorized by Trustco to act on its behalf and was subject to 
Trustco's control in relation to the Farr transaction. Consequently, an agency relationship 
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was entered into between Trustco and Reed . . . . When viewed in a light most favorable to 
Farr, the facts establish that Trustco authorized Reed to act on its behalf in relation to the Farr 
insurance coverage." (Farr brief, p. 26). In order to support this argument, Farr appears to 
rely solely on Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature for the May 23, 2003 broker of 
record letter, Reed's collection of Farr's premium check, and the fact Reed provided certain 
information Safeco requested in connection with binding the previously-quoted Safeco 
coverage. (Farr brief, p. 26) 
Farr claims the foregoing facts demonstrate an agent-subagent relationship 
between Trustco and Reed, citing Phillips v. JCMDevelopment Corporation, 666 P.2d 876 
(Utah 1983). In Phillips, the court applied Section 406 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency in analyzing the duties an agent owes to its principal for the conduct of a subagent. 
But Farr's duty argument ignores an important threshold determination: how an agent-
subagent relationship is formed. 
Section 5 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a subagent as "a 
person appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by the 
agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be 
primarily responsible." Comment D to Subsection 5 explains: 
A subagent performing acts which the appointing agent has 
authorized him to perform in accordance with an authorization 
from the principal is an agent of the principal and affects the 
relations of the principal to third persons as fully as if the 
appointing agent had done such acts. . . . The subagent is also 
the agent of the appointing agent, with power to subject the 
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appointing agent to liability to the principal for his defaults in 
the performance of the principal's business, and to third persons 
for his acts within the scope of his authority or employment. 
Likewise, the appointing agent has the same rights and liabilities 
with respect to the subject as any other principal as to his agent. 
Id, internal citations omitted. 
This court has explained that normally the question of whether an agency 
relationship exists is one of fact, which the court reviews for an abuse of discretion. 
However, where the evidence as to the agent's authority is undisputed, or different 
reasonable, logical inferences may not be drawn therefrom, the question of agency is one of 
law. Mecham Consolidated Oil and Transport v. Consolidated Oil & Transportation, Inc., 
53 P.3d 479, 482 (Ut. App. 2002). In order to be an agent a person must be authorized by 
another to act on his behalf, and subject to his control. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 
970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998). 
The following facts remain undisputed: Trustco had no involvement in 
obtaining insurance coverage for Farr prior to May 23, 2003, the day the broker of record 
letter was signed by Farr. (R. 1667, 2538). Prior to Trustco's involvement, Duane Farr 
spent approximately an hour with Reed during one of their meetings, going over things Farr 
needed. Duane Farr used the previous year's Trinity policy to make sure he had all of Farr's 
insurance needs covered. (R. 1696-97) On May 14, 2003, "Reed gave Duane Farr a 
Reed/Farmers Insurance Proposal." (R. 2348-2368) However, as of May 23, 2003, Duane 
Farr understood that "Farmers was not going to insure that part of the policy and that [Reed] 
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had to get it from somebody else. And Trustco was the people that [Reed] had gone to. And 
[Reed] wanted to make sure that I was okay on having Trustco handle it." (R. 1716-18) 
Before deciding to go with Trustco, Reed checked with Duane Farr in order 
to "make sure" it was okay. Reed's involvement in executing the broker of record letter and 
collecting the premium check were completed in furtherance of Farr's explicit direction that 
Trustco bind coverage on May 23, 2003. These facts show that Reed was not Trustco's 
subagent. Reed met with Duane Farr regarding Farr's insurance needs. Reed submitted 
proposals to several insurance agencies prior to contacting Trustco on May 23, 2003. When 
Reed was unable to obtain insurance coverage from other providers, Reed worked to "get it 
from somebody else." Farr's attempt to characterize Reed as Trustco's subagent, and thereby 
impute his actions to Trustco, fails as a matter of law. 
Farr asks rhetorically "if Reed was not acting on behalf of Trustco, how did 
Trustco obtain Farr's account?" (Farr brief, p. 28). Farr answers this question on the next 
page of its brief: "Trustco was thus obviously acting exactly as expected of an insurance 
producer in seeking to bind and in binding coverage for Farr, a commercial insurance 
customer which happened to have been referred to Trustco by Kirchen and Reed." (Farr 
brief, p. 29, emphasis added). 
Kirchen referred the Farr account to Trustco as a courtesy to Reed. Trustco 
was asked to substitute as broker of record for previously-quoted Safeco coverage. In 
furtherance of that effort, Reed obtained Farr's signature on the May 23, 2003 broker of 
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record letter and collected Farr's premium check. No agent-subagent or principal-agent 
relationship existed between Trustco and Reed. Reed simply performed ministerial functions 
in transmitting a request to bind previously-quoted coverage, and then furnishing information 
requested by Safeco after the May 23, 2003 oral binder. Reed's involvement in obtaining 
Farr's signature on the broker of record letter and collecting Farr's premium check were 
similar ministerial acts, and do not support Farr's claim that Reed acted as Trustco's 
subagent. See e.g. Vinav. Jefferson Insurance Co. of New York, 7'61 P.2d 581, 586 (Ut. App. 
1988) (performance of ministerial acts did not support plaintiffs claim of agency). 
CONCLUSION 
Trustco did what it was asked to do: bind the previously-quoted Safeco 
coverage on May 23, 2003. Moreover, Reed was not Trustco's subagent, and Trustco is not 
responsible for any of Reed's alleged acts or omissions. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling 
granting Trustco's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this \A_ day of March, 2008. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
GARY T. WIGHT 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Trustco, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH ~" 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT-
ASAEL FARR & SONS COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
reciprocal or'inter-insurance 
exchange; ANDREW L. REED; 
TRUSTCO, INC., a corporation; 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation; AMERICAN STATES 
INSURANCE CO., a corporation; 
HARTFORD STEAM BOILER 
INSPECTION AND INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation; STEPHEN D. KIRCHEN; 
CENTRAL BONDS & INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., a corporation; 
CENTRAL BONDS AND INSURANCE 
COMPANY INCORPORATED, a 
corporation; AUTO-OWNERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation; BLACKBURN JONES 
COMPANY, a corporation; E. KENT 
JONES; TRINITY UNIVERSAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF KANSAS, 
INC., a corporation; TRINITY 
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation; and UNITRIN PROPERTY 
& CASUALTY INSURANCE GROUP, a 
corporation or common enterprise, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 040913675 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
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On May 4,2007, the Court heard oral arguments on: (1) Defendant Hartford Steam 
Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) 
Defendant Safeco insurance Company of Amenca and American States Insurance 
Company's Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Plaintiff Asae! Farr's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment against defendants Hartford and Safeco. 
On May 7, 2007, the Court heard oral arguments on the remaining motions, 
including: (1) Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint; 
(2) Plaintiff Asaei Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On Apportionment; (3) 
Plaintiff Asael Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Safeco 
Insurance Company, American States Insurance CoM Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and 
Insurance Co., Andrew L Reed, and Trustco inc. On Liability Issues; (4) Defendant Auto 
Owners Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment: (5) Defendant Trustco's 
Motion For Summary Judgment; (6) Defendants Stephen D. Kirchen, Central Bonds & 
Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance Company Incorporated's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; and (7) Defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Andrew 
Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the May 7m hearing the Court 
took all matters under advisement except for plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on 
apportionment which the Court indicated it would reserve until, if necessary, the time of 
trial. 
Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefing, arguments and relevant legal 
authorities, the Court now rules as stated herein. 
I. Background 
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This case contains a somewhat lengthy and relatively complex factual background 
For that reason, a brief synopsis of the undisputed facts is warranted 
Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Company ("Farr") is a locally based ice cream 
manufactureranddistnbutorin operation since incorporation in 1920 Farr's current lawsuit 
stems from an incident which occurred on May 29, 2003, at the company's cold storage 
warehouse located in Salt Lake City, Utah On that date an electric condenser fan 
accidentally sheared off its mount and severed an ammonia line, thereby releasing 
ammonia and contaminating plaintiffs product stored at the warehouse As of November 
7, 2003 Farr calculated damages exceeding $1,500,000 00. 
immediately after the accident, Farr notified its insurer, American States Insurance 
Company ("American States"), of the loss Pursuant to the Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage portion of the policy, American States paid Farr $25,000 00- -the policy limit for 
ammonia contamination Finding coverage insufficient for the loss suffered, Farr filed its 
current action against the fifteen named defendants alleging causes of action against each 
for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and promissory estoppel 
From May 14,2002, to May 14, 2003, Plaintiff Asael Farr & Sons Farr was insured 
for commercial property and liability insurance through Unitnn Property & Casualty Group 
('Unitnn") In March 2003, Unitrm's subsidiary, Trinity Universal Insurance, advised Farr 
that its policy would not be renewed beyond the expiration date Under Fair's Unitnn policy 
Equipment Breakdown Coverage for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination 
was subject to a $25,000 liability limit 
Upon learning of Unitrm's non-renewal, Farr began working with its insurance agent 
Andrew Reed ('Reed"), a captive agent of Truckers Insurance Exchange/Farmers 
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Insurance Group ("Farmers"), in order to obtain comprehensive property and liability 
coverage. Thereafter, Farmers' declined coverage on the Farr policy, and Reed began 
contacting other agents and insurers. In March 2003, Reed contacted Steven Kirchen 
("Ktrchen") of Central Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Central Bonds"). At Reed's 
request, Kirchen contacted other agents and insurers and eventually obtained a bid from 
Auto Owners Insurance Company ("Auto Owners"). Auto Owners indicated, however, that 
any writing on the Farr policy was subject to office approval and additional insurer 
information on items such as loss history and property valuations. 
On May 14, 2003, Farr delivered a check to Auto Owners in the amount of 
$7,838.83 for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverages. Shortly thereafter, 
Auto Owners' underwriting department declined coverage on the Farr account and returned 
the Farr's uncashed check. 
On May 23, 2003, in a continued attempt to obtain coverage, Kirchen put Reed in 
contact with Troy Granger of Trustco Inc. ('Trustco"). Relying upon Reed's instructions, 
Farr appointed Trustco as its Broker of Record, thereby giving Trustco the authority 
necessary to handle affairs associated with writing the Farr policy. Shortly thereafter, 
Trustco placed Farr's coverage with American States, an affiliate of Safeco Insurance 
Company ("Safeco") and American States/Safeco issued Farr a policy active from May 23, 
2003 to May 23, 2004. 
A short six days later, on May 29,2004, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr 
warehouse. 
On May 31,2005, Farrfiled its Third Amended Complaint against Andrew Reed and 
a group Farr labeled as "Primary Defendants," consisting of: Truckers' Insurance 
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Exchange, Trustco, Safeco, American States Insurance, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
and Insurance Co., Steve Kirchen, Central Bonds and Insurance Incorporated and Auto 
Owners Insurance. Each of Farr's causes of action stem from the so-called "Reed's 
Commitment" in which Farr alleges that Reed bound the primary defendants for ail of Farr's 
insurable risks. Specifically, Fair claims on and before May 14, 2003, Andrew Reed, 
while acting both for himself and as the duly authorized agent for TIE, 
Trustco, Safeco, American, Hartford, Kirchen, Central Agency, 
Central Bonds and Auto Owners ("Primary Defendants") had received 
payment for and affirmatively represented to plaintiff: (a) that 
the Primary Defendants had duly bound and provided plaintiff with all 
necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for al! of plaintiff's 
significant insurable risks, including all insurable risks related to Plaintiff's 
Products, and (b) that the Primary Defendants, and each, of them had 
agreed, committed, and become jointly obligated to provide plaintiff 
with all such necessary, available and appropriate insurance 
coverage for all of Plaintiffs Products and all of plaintiffs significant 
insurable risks ("Reeds Commitment") effective May 14, 2003. 
Third Amended Complaint fl 21. 
ii. Pending Motions 
A. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint 
Farr's Motion For Leave To File Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to join Travelers 
Indemnity Company/Travelers Boiler Express ("Travelers") as a party to this action. In 
support of its motion, Farr contends that through discovery and the deposition of Stephen 
Kirchen, Farr learned that Travelers bound insurance coverage for ail or a portion of the 
damages for which it seeks relief. Defendants, Auto Owners Insurance Company, Stephen 
Kirchen, Central Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc. and Central Bonds And Insurance 
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Company Incorporated oppose amendment, arguing that adding Travelers as a party 
would be futile 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be "freely 
given when justice so requires." Justice, however, does not require that leave be given 
"if doing so would be futile." IHC v Jensen 2003 UT 51, H 139, 82 P.3d 1076, citing, 
Benton v Adams 56 P.3d 81, 86 (Colo 2002) (internal citations omitted)), 
A reading of Stephen Kirchen's deposition, reveals that Kirchen did not represent 
that Travelers bound coverage. Instead, Kirchen testified that Travelers had merely issued 
a spoilage and equipment breakdown quote which was contingent upon Farr's submission 
of additional information (e.g. mortgages, loss payees, address/contact names for 
inspection). Stephen Kirchen Deposition, at 66-67. None of the additional information 
was ever provided Moreover, Travelers' quote was a supplement to a potential policy from 
Auto Owners. Kirchen Deposition at 66. As a result, when Auto-Owners declined to write 
coverage for Farr, the Travelers portion of the proposed coverage was declined as well. 
Kirchen Deposition at 68. 
Concluding that Kirchen's testimony does not support plaintiffs assertion that 
Travelers bound Farr's coverage, the Court finds that amendment would be futile and 
denies plaintiffs Motion To Amend. Accordingly, Farr's Third Amended Complaint shall 
be the operative complaint for consideration of all remaining motions and to that extent the 
Court will not address Farr's "new" claims involving allegations of an oral binder and policy 
ambiguity. 
B. Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford 
And Defendant Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.'s 
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Motion For Summary Judgment 
On December 31,2000, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company 
("Hartford") entered into a reinsurance agreement with Safeco Insurance Company of 
America ("Safeco"), under which Hartford agreed to reinsure 100% of the Equipment 
Breakdown liability policies issued by Safeco and its affiliates. At the time of the ammonia 
accident at Farr's storage warehouse, American States, an affiliate of Safeco, was Farr's 
insurer. Apparently in its role as reinsurer for Safeco, Farr now brings claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, negligence, bad faith and equitable estoppel. The basis 
for each of Farr's causes of action is "Reed's Commitment"—the claim that Andrew Reed, 
while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Hartford, represented to plaintiff that Hartford 
bound coverage for all of FarrJs products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint, 
at 11 21. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Hartford. As a result, all of Farr's causes 
of action against defendant stem from an alleged agency relationship between Reed and 
Hartford under which Reed, as Hartford's agent, acted on behalf of and subject to 
Hartford's control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence of an agency 
relationship between Reed and Hartford. To be an agent, a person umust be authorized 
by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control/" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of 
Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998) {citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency §1 
(1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of the Farmers 
Group of Insurance Companies, and not an employee of Hartford. Andrew Reed 
Deposition, at 397-98. Moreover, Andrew Reed specifically testified that he did not have 
an agency contract with Hartford and did not have any authority to act on Hartford's behalf. 
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Reed Deposition, at 398. Absent evidence of an agency relationship, Farr's claims against 
Hartford for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and estoppel all fail. 
Accordingly, Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Hartford is 
denied and Hartford's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
C. Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Kirchen and Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated And Defendants Stephen Kirchen, Central 
Bonds & Insurance Agency Inc., and Central Bonds & Insurance 
Company Incorporated's Motion For Summary Judgment 
As an initial matter, in its opposition to defendants' motion, Farr fails to effectively 
dispute and support with contrary evidence detendant Central Bonds and Insurance 
Company Incorporated's claim that it had no involvement in the events at issue in this 
litigation. Accordingly, defendant Central Bonds and Insurance Company Inc.'s Motion For 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
Defendant Stephen Kirchen ("Kirchen") was employed as an insurance agent by 
defendant Centra! Bonds and Insurance Agency ("Central Bonds"). Sometime in March 
2003, Andrew Reed contacted Kirchen and requested his assistance in placing the Farr 
account. At Reed's request, Kirchen contacted several insurance companies including 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company. After Auto Owners' declined Farr's coverage, Kirchen 
put Reed in touch with Trustco Insurance Inc. and its agent Troy Granger. Thereafter, 
Kirchen and Central Bonds had no further involvement with the Farr account. 
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against Kirchen and Central Bonds is 
"Reed's CommitmentMhe claim that Andrew Reed
 5 while acting as the "duly authorized 
agent" for. Kirchen and Central Bonds, represented to Farr that Central Bonds, by and 
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through Kirchen, bound coverage for all of Farr's products, and insurable risks. Third 
Amended Complaint, a! ]} 7 I!. 
Farr has no contractual relationship with Kirchen .T Contral'Bonds. Consequently, 
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Whilu dtlumplmg to place Farr's coverage, Andrew Reed contacted Troy Granger 
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of defendant Trustco, Inc ("Trustco"). On May 23,2003, Trustco successfully bound Farr's 
property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage with Safeco/American States 
Insurance ("American States") through a policy active from May 23,2003, through May 23, 
2004. Six days later, on May 29, 2003, the ammonia accident occurred at the Farr 
warehouse. 
Farr's American States policy contained a $25,000.00 Equipment Breakdown 
Coverage provision for the loss of perishable goods due to contamination from the release 
of ammonia. Consequently, after the ammonia leak at Farr cold storage warehouse, 
American States paid Farr the policy limit. 
The basis for each of Farr's causes of action against American States is "Reed's 
Commitment"-the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting as the "duly authorized agent' for 
American States represented that American States bound coverage on all of plaintiffs 
products and insurable risks. Third Amended Complaint at f^f 21. 
In Utah, in order to be an agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on 
his behalf and subject to his control." Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 
1269 (Utah 1989) {citing, Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)) . Here, it is 
undisputed that Reed was not authorized to act on behalf of American States. Andrew 
Reed Deposition at 519-520. Reed had no authority to bind American States and could 
not act as an agent on behatf o1 American States. Absent any such relationship, p'lamWH's 
breach of contract, negligence, bad faith, and estoppel claims fail. 
As Farr's actual insurer, it is important to note that plaintiff does state what duty it 
asserts as the basis for its negligence claim. However, there is no authority in support of 
Farr's claim that an insurance company, absent some specific directive, has an obligation 
10 
to evaluate and ascertain the insurable risks of each insured. Finally, as tn Farr's estoppel 
claim, despit . ihs^nn -1 r y ,MHI> \ iJh1i»i ,!,!, he i . . .ui-icethat 
An lerican States made an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the coverage it 
ultimately p:- >• 
Plaintiff Farr's Motioi \ For Partial Summary Judgment is denied and Defendants 
Safeco/American States' Motion F' :>i Si in 11 i lai \ h i igi: i \e i it is gi am ited. 
p Di^;~+:*f p a r r j s Motion For Partial Sumn tat y Ji idgment Against Auto 
Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance Company's 
or Summary Judgment 
in earlv May 2003, Stephen Kirchen via use of Auto Owners1 computer mlini| 
[ :• r • .,: .< coverage.. On May 13,2003, Kircf len 
provided the rate information to Auto Owners and underwriting informed him that fir sal 
dnnki in (in tln< < i •« «i II|*« v\ " i(Hilnn|f ni i i | >II I in iftice approval and additional 
application information. 
s
 • - • - '• .p . ea che*.-. u\ •:. ,; , . 
payable to Auto Owners for property, liability and equipment breakdown coverage. Several 
days later, 'i : n -*• ' the 
home office declined coverage on the Farr account, f- ar rs uncashed check made payable 
to Owners was returned to Farr, 
i I ie basis for all of Fai i "s causes of action against ' y. Owners is *"w->.* 
Commitment—the claim that Andrew Reed, while acting ! -*. • J 
fi
 J ito Ovi ners.represei ited that Auto Owners had bound coverage for all of Farr's products 
and insurable risks.,,. Third Amended Complaint •,** 1. 
I .in has no contr actual relationship wit! i Auto Owners, As a result, all of Farr's 
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causes of action against the defendant stern from an alleged agency relationship between 
Reed and Auto Owners under which Reed, as Auto Owners' agent, acted on behalf of and 
subject to Auto Owners' control. Despite Farr's theory, the record contains no evidence 
of an agency relationship between Auto Owners and Reed, In Utah, in order to be an 
agent a person "must be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his 
control/" Gildea v Guardian Title Co. of Utah 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1989) (citing, 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)). Here, it is undisputed that Andrew Reed 
was not authorized to act on behalf of Auto Owners. In his deposition Reed specifically 
states that he was not an agent of Auto Owners and never had authority to represent the 
company. Andrew Reed Deposition, at 351-52. Absent evidence of an agency 
relationship, Farr's claims against Auto Owners for breach of contract, bad faith, 
negligence and estoppel must fail. 
Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment against Auto Owners is 
denied, and defendant Auto Owners Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
F, Plaintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truck 
insurance Exchange and Andrew Reed & Truck Insurance Exchange 
and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment 
1. Truck Insurance Exchange/Farmers Insurance 
As with the other defendants, Farr asserts causes of action against Truck Insurance 
Exchange (Farmers lnsurance/nFarmersn) for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence and 
equitable estoppel. Distinguishing Farmers from the other primary defendants, however, 
is the fact that Andrew Reed was a captive agent of Farmers insurance. As Farmers' 
agent, Farr claims that Reed represented that Farmers "duly bound and provided plaintiff 
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with-all necessary and appropriate insurance coverage for all of plaintiff s significant 
Despite the existence of an agency relationship between Farmers and Reed, it is 
undisputed that5 ' , _>ness, and tl lat as early 
as May 23, 200*3, rarr Knew that harrners declined coverane Dexter Farr Deposition, at 
158-59. Th " > • • • -
 : ,i mers was solely lim;;t:.l to 
Reed's attempt to place Farr's coverage with Farmers; once Farmers declined, Reed was 
no longer Farmer's ~ : . ^:;jmpts to secure 
coverage through u\w\ insures • n^s, as to its contr -set bfjsc - claims Farr admits it did 
not have ^ ^ ^ a u wan - -. \ acts to the 
contrary. Additionally, in si ipport of its estoppel claim Farr has not provided any evidence 
of an admission statement or act inconsisfpni vith if-inning'nIn invifn i i'uvcidye prior 
to the accidei;:. ; ;; ^ ; i y , . arr's negligence claim aiso fails because plaintiff fails to establish 
any c Jtv thst Farmo^' rM.v-?d tn p^rr and did not fi jlfill, 
n ' ~. . i>-.-* - i-artia! Summar y Judgment Against ""'uc> :r-oinnce 
Exchange/Farmers : ^Mrgnc^ ^nied ai id Dof*-r. 
[ /change/I <JI ima•. ^ ^ .„t, ; ^ L , ^ . ,, wummary Judgment is granted. 
J" Am how Poi.nl 
t-Sasei1 M| '.I " ] "" od's a vement with the Farr account, the parties' 
motions must be considered in sompwhni different posture than the r*» •*.-* . 
I HI I'S \\n\w\y\' \\\ ,ii tiun - jntract against Reed is not - . w ;ne cat;t) of 
Harris v Albrecht a case of whether a contract of insurance exists.-2004 UT ' 
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the issue is whether the coverage obtained by Reed was sufficient to meet plaintiffs 
needs, or whether Reed contracted for adequate coverage of all significant insurable risks. 
Third Amended Complaint ^ 27. Albrecht is, however, helpful insofar as it addresses 
basic contract principles relevant to insurance contracts, including the rule that an agent 
must have definite directions from the insured as to the type and amount of coverage 
needed in order to establish the requisite meeting of the minds. Albrecht at fi11 (finding, 
failure to procure insurance does not arise unless agent has "definite directions from the 
insured to consummate a final contract") In the instant case the undisputed facts 
establish that Reed obtained a policy of insurance containing coverage similar to Farr's 
prior policy with Unitrin, and that Farr did not provide Reed with any specific direction to 
acquire additional coverage beyond that previous obtained. In fact to the contrary, the 
evidence reveals that Farr specifically rejected Reed's suggestion to increase Farr's 
inventory coverage Dexter Farr Deposition at 102-103. A blanket request for adequate 
coverage and a specific rejection of increased spoilage coverage is inadequate to establish 
any contract or commitment on the part of Reed to unilaterally procure an insurance policy 
for Farr that contained coverage beyond their specifications. Thus, based upon the 
undisputed facts, there is no evidence to support a claim for breach of contract or bad faith 
since Reed performed his agreement with Farr and obtained a policy of insurance 
consistent with Farr's request. 
With respect to plaintiffs estoppel claim, there is no evidence in the record to show 
that Reed misrepresented the state of the Farr's insurance coverage. While Farr argues 
that Reed represented coverage was in place and failed to explain the terms of the policy, 
neither allegation amounts to a misrepresentation. First, the statement by Reed that 
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coverage was in place was undisputedly true; a policy was in place prior to the accident. 
Second, 1h " - - • • \ - -^ i - ;-_,; ;;neir coverage does not 
amount rdsonaoie feiianc- .- «: ?ip\ -virienr, > supporting claims of 
misrepresentation L ~ ils. 
Finally, as to tlie cause of action for negligence, Reed clearly hn«i ^ Hntv ?-• ^ -o>r 
insurance coverage consistent will i II r Friu,,: "xpi essed \ equc . .*. ^;\ ,.,
 K.^- .•.;;.. 
assertion, there was no breach of this cuty since Reed, absent any specific instruction from 
Farr,.obtained coverage consistent '-ere • no 
duty between Reed and Farr that requires-Reed to insist on procuring a coverage limit 
greater than that which Farr requested. ' 'IUIII-HHII1, '-'ill. I. • »y > I !• pi untitl:; argument 
I hut Reed had j duty to communicate the "coverage gap" to f- arrp rhe record indicates that 
Reed did so when he suggested additional coverage, Dexter Fai i Deposition »il. I "J J I U',1. 
, . - ;.... *.i.;s it did not understand the differences in policy coverage 
does not negate the hr t th^t ^APM did communicate *1'**- ••* r . < •• 
uppons . . i , . s argument that Reed misrepresented the state of 
coverage and the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no fni "<» mi , y
 v\ .n . i 
perfninifn i!uih ' , J I pijiiititi • insurance agent. Accordingly, «-£i"'s claim for negligence 
is denied., 
i uiniril r - * rr < hi i i i i min •ujniiu.^ y augment Against Andrew Reed is 
denied and Andrew Reed's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. 
" -
l;aintiff Farr's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Against Truster} & 
Defendant Trustco's Motion For Summary Judgment 
i rustco's involvement in this matter stems from a May 23, 2003, letter •>•** • <• 
Duane Farr nppMinlinq Tiu'ilu' H^ I HII ^ Hn«h;t of Record In its capacity as Broker, 
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Trustco, by and through Troy Granger, placed Farr's coverage with American States; the 
policy in place at the time of the ammonia accident. 
Limiting the allegations against Trustco to those contained in the Third Amended 
Complaint, all causes of action against Trustco stem from "Reed's Commitmenf-the claim 
that Andrew Reed, while acting as a "duly authorized agent" for Trustco, represented that 
Trustco bound coverage for all of Farr's products and insurable risks. Third Amended 
Complaint, at IT 21. 
Similar to the other defendants, the Court concludes there is no evidence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Trustco. in Utah, to be an agent a person "must 
be authorized by another to 'act on his behalf and subject to his control'" Gildeav Guardian 
Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998)(c/f/ng, Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 1 (1958)). While Farr relies upon Reed's involvement in obtaining a signature 
for Trustco to act as Broker of Record letter and Reed's collection of a premium as 
evidence of an agency relationship, such evidence actually supports the existence of an 
agency relationship between Reed and Farr since it is undisputed that all information 
regarding Farr's insurance needs were communicated to Trustco by Reed. 
As to plaintiffs1 contract based claims, the evidence reflects that Trustco fulfilled all 
of the terms of its agreement with Farr by serving as its broker of record and binding 
coverage with Safeco/American States effective May 23, 2003. Additionally, there is no 
evidence of an admission, statement or act inconsistent with Trustco's role as broker. 
Similarly, Farr's negligence claim also fails because there is no evidence that Trustco had 
a duty to determine whether the amount of coverage in the Safeco/American States policy 
was sufficient to meets plaintiffs needs. 
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For these reasons p'qsntit-f Kjrr 's Motion { % ' •" $t 
1 iiuslco .: : „ .. JG, .J..U ^u , . . i j i i . u : rustco's Motiui - o ' oumrr. -,ry Judgment ib yrantoa 
III. Conclusion 
In -^-. ...«s.u;., plaintiff is ui i able to support its allegationsagainst the defendants as 
stated in Farr's Third Amended r.-vnpM-.: 7n-;-: absence c1 telationsliip 
be t - " ' - . .: . j v veiendanfs t legates %tr* eiie-r c any 
representations Reed aib-cpdiy made on the insurers' behalf. '•' **• 1/ 
RHPCI ininscll, I'he MM, uid indicates his suggestions to alter coverage from that established 
under Farr's prior policy was rejected and Reed has no duty to obtain \ nveraip bevond 
tlmlt h:'i,|ijf; id 11 If i |||i idbUlud. 
This Ruling will stand as the-Order of the Court" wanting and denyinq tho motinn*. 
as ' .. < j to be prepared by counsel 
B* : HE COURT: 
(Zh^^^Q^S^S^ 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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